Tag Archives: Asset Bubble

Yes, Rates Are Still Going To Zero

“If the U.S. economy entered a recession soon and interest rates fell in line with levels seen during the moderate recessions of 1990 and 2001, yields on even longer-dated Treasury securities could fall to or below zero.” – Senior Fed Economist, Michael Kiley – January 20, 2020

I was emailed this article no less than twenty times within a few hours of it hitting the press. Of course, this was not a surprise to us. To wit:

“Outside of other events such as the S&L Crisis, Asian Contagion, Long-Term Capital Management, etc. which all drove money out of stocks and into bonds pushing rates lower, recessionary environments are especially prone at suppressing rates further. Given the current low level of interest rates, the next recessionary bout in the economy will very likely see rates near zero.” 

That article was written more than 3-years ago in August 2016. 

Of course, three-years ago, as the “Bond Gurus,” like Jeff Gundlach and Bill Gross, were flooding the media with talk about how the “bond bull market was dead,” and “interest rates were going to rise to 4%, or more,” I repeatedly penned why this could not, and would not, be the case.

While it seemed a laughable concept at the time, particularly as the Fed was preparing to hike rates and reduce their balance sheet, the critical aspect of leverage was overlooked.

“There is an assumption that because interest rates are low, that the bond bull market has come to its inevitable conclusion. The problem with this assumption is three-fold:

  1. All interest rates are relative. With more than $10-Trillion in debt globally sporting negative interest rates, the assumption that rates in the U.S. are about to spike higher is likely wrong. Higher yields in U.S. debt attracts flows of capital from countries with negative yields, which pushes rates lower in the U.S. Given the current push by Central Banks globally to suppress interest rates to keep nascent economic growth going, an eventual zero-yield on U.S. debt is not unrealistic.
  2. The coming budget deficit balloon. Given the lack of fiscal policy controls in Washington, and promises of continued largesse in the future, the budget deficit is set to swell above $1 Trillion in coming years. This will require more government bond issuance to fund future expenditures, which will be magnified during the next recessionary spat as tax revenue falls.
  3. Central Banks will continue to be a buyer of bonds to maintain the current status quo, but will become more aggressive buyers during the next recession. The next QE program by the Fed to offset the next economic recession will likely be $2-4 Trillion which will push the 10-year yield towards zero.”

Of course, since the penning of that article, let’s take a look at where we currently stand:

  1. Negative yielding debt surged past $17 trillion pushing more dollars into positive yielding U.S. Treasuries which led to rates hitting decade lows in 2019.
  2. The budget deficit has indeed swelled to $1 Trillion and will exceed that mark in 2020 as unbridled Government largesse continues to run amok in Washington.
  3. The Federal Reserve, following a very short period of trying to hike rates and reduce the bloated balance sheet, completely reversed the policy stance by cutting rates and flooding the system with liquidity by ramping up bond purchases.

The biggest challenge the Fed faces currently is how to deal with a recession. Given the current expansion is the longest on record; a downturn at some point is inevitable. Over the last decade, as shown in the chart below, the Federal Reserve has kept rates at extremely low levels, and flooded the system with liquidity, which did NOT have the effect of fostering either economic growth or inflation to any significant degree. (As noted the composite index is of inflation, GDP, wages, and savings which has closely tracked the long-term trend of interest rates.)

Naturally, at any point monetary accommodation is removed, an economic, and market downturn is almost immediate. This is why it is feared central banks do not have enough tools to fight the next recession. During and after the financial crisis, they responded with a mixture of conventional interest-rate cuts and, when these reached their limit, with experimental measures, such as bond-buying (“quantitative easing”, or QE) and making promises about future policy (“forward guidance”).

The trouble currently is that global short-term interest rates are still close to, or below zero, and cannot be cut much more, which has deprived central banks of their main lever if a recession strikes.

The Fed Is Trapped

While the Fed talks about wanting higher rates of inflation, as shown above, they can’t run the risk that rates will rise. Simply, in an economy that requires $5 of debt to create $1 of economic growth, the leverage ratio requires rates to remain low or “bad things” happen economically.

1) The Federal Reserve has been buying bonds for the last 10- years in an attempt to keep interest rates suppressed to support the economy. The recovery in economic growth is still dependent on massive levels of domestic and global interventions. Sharply rising rates will immediately curtail that growth as rising borrowing costs slows consumption.

2) Rising interest rates immediately slows the housing market, taking that small contribution to the economy away. People buy payments, not houses, and rising rates mean higher payments.

3) An increase in interest rates means higher borrowing costs, which leads to lower profit margins for corporations. This will negatively impact the stock market given that a bulk of the “share buybacks” have been completed through the issuance of debt.

4) One of the main arguments of stock bulls over the last 10-years has been the stocks are cheap based on low interest rates. When rates rise, the market becomes overvalued very quickly.

5) The massive derivatives market will be negatively impacted, leading to another potential credit crisis as interest rate spread derivatives go bust.

6) As rates increase, so does the variable rate interest payments on credit cards. With the consumer being impacted by stagnant wages, higher credit card payments will lead to a rapid contraction in disposable income and rising defaults. 

7) Rising defaults on debt service will negatively impact banks, which are still not adequately capitalized and still burdened by large levels of risky debt.

8) Commodities, which are very sensitive to the direction and strength of the global economy, will plunge in price as recession sets in. (Such may already be underway.)

9) The deficit/GDP ratio will begin to soar as borrowing costs rise sharply. The many forecasts for lower future deficits have already crumbled as the deficits have already surged to $1 Trillion and will continue to climb.

10) Rising interest rates will negatively impact already massively underfunded pension plans leading to insecurity about the ability to meet future obligations. With a $7 Trillion funding gap, a “run” on the pension system becomes a high probability.

I could go on but you get the idea.

The issue of rising borrowing costs spreads through the entire financial ecosystem like a virus. The rise and fall of stock prices have very little to do with the average American and their participation in the domestic economy. This is because the vast majority of Americans are living paycheck-to-paycheck.

However, since average American’s requires roughly $3000 in debt annually to maintain their standard of living, interest rates are an entirely different matter.

As I noted last week, this is a problem too large for the Fed to bail out, which is why they are terrified of an economic downturn.

The Fed’s End Game

The ability of the Fed to use monetary policy to combat recessions is at an end. A recent article by the WSJ agrees with our assessment above.

“In many countries, interest rates are so low, even negative, that central banks can’t lower them further. Tepid economic growth and low inflation mean they can’t raise rates, either.

Since World War II, every recovery was ushered in with lower rates as the Fed moved to stimulate growth. Every recession was preceded by higher interest rates as the Fed sought to contain inflation.

But with interest rates now stuck around zero, central banks are left without their principal lever over the business cycle. The eurozone economy is stalling, but the European Central Bank, having cut rates below zero, can’t or won’t do more. Since 2008, Japan has had three recessions with the Bank of Japan, having set rates around zero, largely confined to the sidelines.

The U.S. might not be far behind. ‘We are one recession away from joining Europe and Japan in the monetary black hole of zero rates and no prospect of escape,’ said Harvard University economist Larry Summers. The Fed typically cuts short-term interest rates by 5 percentage points in a recession, he said, yet that is impossible now with rates below 2%.”

This too sounds familiar as it is something we wrote in 2017 prior to the passage of the tax reform bill:

The reality is that the U.S. is now caught in the same liquidity trap as Japan. With the current economic recovery already pushing the long end of the economic cycle, the risk is rising that the next economic downturn is closer than not. The danger is that the Federal Reserve is now potentially trapped with an inability to use monetary policy tools to offset the next economic decline when it occurs.

This is the same problem that Japan has wrestled with for the last 20 years. While Japan has entered into an unprecedented stimulus program (on a relative basis twice as large as the U.S. on an economy 1/3 the size) there is no guarantee that such a program will result in the desired effect of pulling the Japanese economy out of its 30-year deflationary cycle. The problems that face Japan are similar to what we are currently witnessing in the U.S.:

  • A decline in savings rates to extremely low levels which depletes productive investments
  • An aging demographic that is top heavy and drawing on social benefits at an advancing rate.
  • A heavily indebted economy with debt/GDP ratios above 100%.
  • A decline in exports due to a weak global economic environment.
  • Slowing domestic economic growth rates.
  • An underemployed younger demographic.
  • An inelastic supply-demand curve
  • Weak industrial production
  • Dependence on productivity increases to offset reduced employment

The lynchpin to Japan, and the U.S., remains demographics and interest rates. As the aging population grows becoming a net drag on “savings,” the dependency on the “social welfare net” will continue to expand. The “pension problem” is only the tip of the iceberg.

It’s good news the WSJ, and mainstream economists, are finally catching up to analysis we have been producing over the last several years.

The only problem is that it is likely too little, too late.Save



No Matter What The Fed Does, It’s Bullish?

It’s Bullish…Always

Last Wednesday, the Federal Reserve announced the latest decision concerning monetary policy which contained three primary components:

  1. A cut of 25bps
  2. Stopping balance sheet reductions (or Quantitative Tightening or Q.T.)
  3. An outlook suggestive this may be the only rate cut for a while.

While stocks dropped on disappointment they Fed may not cut further; it didn’t take long for bullish commentators to start suggesting why the cuts were supportive of higher asset prices. To wit:

“Given today’s Fed decision and guidance, we remain comfortable with our view that the Fed will provide two more 25bp cuts this year (September and October),” – Bank of America.

Simply, cutting rates, and stopping Q.T., is the return of “accommodative policy” for the markets and the “ringing of Pavlov’s bell.”  Via CNBC:

“The old investing mantra ‘don’t fight the Fed’ stands the test of time for a reason. Going back to 1982, the average annualized return for the S&P 500 between the first rate cut and the next hike has been 20%, while the median increase has been 13%, according to Strategas. The data show investors would do well if they invest in a way that aligns with the Federal Reserve’s policy direction, rather than against it, hence ‘don’t fight the Fed.’”

This is an interesting premise because when the Fed started hiking rates at the end of 2015, it also was bullish. Via Forbes:

“Early in a rate increase cycle, however, higher rates are actually good for the stock market. This is because rising rates, early on, signal an improving economy, and the faster growth more than compensates for higher rates.”

So, exactly “when” are Fed actions are “not bullish?” 

I would suggest now.

As I noted in this past weekend’s missive:

“Lower rates have less impact on the ‘economy,’when the monetary transmission system is weak. This is evident from the fact that surging asset prices have left 80% of the population behind in terms of higher levels of prosperity. This also is why tax cuts failed to work as intended. After a decade of low rates, and excess liquidity, the ability to ‘pull-forward’ demand has become limited.”

While, in the short-term, it may seem that whatever the Fed does is “bullish,” as the performance of the stock market since 2009 would seem to support, it has been a function unbridled fiscal largesse. As shown in the chart below, the Fed’s actions have been supported by a massive amount of Government spending as noted last week:

“As shown in the chart below, since 2010 it has taken continually increases in Federal expenditures just to maintain economic growth at the same level it was nearly a decade ago.”

But let’s modify that chart to compare the Fed’s actions plus government expenditures to the S&P 500.

With that much liquidity sloshing around, it had to go somewhere. Not surprisingly, as the Fed suppressed interest rates, it forced investors to chase yield.

The problem with the table from CNBC above, as it only tells you what happens immediately after the Fed cut rates the first time. By the time the Fed is starts cutting rates, the markets are well entrenched into a bullish trend. Stocks aren’t beginning a bull run, but rather are being carried higher by existing momentum which has typically been a hallmark of a late-stage bullish cycle. In every case, there was an eventual negative outcome following Fed rate cut cycles. (The table below uses the 3-month average of the effective Fed Funds rate.)

The chart of the effective Fed funds rate and the S&P 500 tells the story. (The vertical dashed lines marked the initial cuts, and you can see where subsequent crisis and declines occurred.)

The one exception was the initial rate cut in 1995 following the Orange County Bankruptcy, an “insurance cut,” despite both a strong market and economy at the time. As recently noted by J.P. Morgan:

“The late 1990’s rate cuts were used as insurance against Mexican and Russian default and collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management at the time, bolstered the equity market. The only other time the S&P 500 saw stronger performance following a rate cut was in 1980.”

The early 1980s are NOT comparative to the current cycle.

  • The U.S. economy was just coming out of back-to-back recessions
  • Valuations were extremely low
  • Dividends were high; and,
  • Inflation and interest rates were in double-digits.
  • President Reagan had just passed tax reform
  • The banks were deregulated; and,
  • Inflation and interest rates were beginning a 40-year secular decline.
  • Household debt was only about 60% of net worth and just starting a 40-year “leveraging cycle” .

In other words, there was nowhere for the market to go but up.

Clearly, such is not the case today, as deflation, debt, and demographic shifts loom large.

But What About 1995?

The mid-late 1990’s rate cuts was also another anomalous market environment. The Fed began a rate hiking campaign in 1993 as the economy began to stretch its legs post the 1991 recession. However, the Fed cut rates slightly in 1995, and again in 1998, to offset the risk imposed from three major market-related events. Ironically, it was the Fed’s tightening of monetary policy which contributed to those events.

Another critical point is that rates were relatively stable post the 1991 recession rather than the rather sharp increase we have seen over the last couple of years. Also, economic growth, as I showed last week, was running at an average of 3.5% on an inflation-adjusted basis, versus 2%-ish today.

Importantly, the markets sharp advance in the late-1990’s was due to a period of “market nirvana” as the internet became mainstream changing the way information was accessed, utilized, and institutionalized.

  • Mutual funds were a virtual “Hoover vacuum” sucking up retail assets and lofting asset prices higher.
  • Pension funds were finally allowed to invest in stocks, rather than just Treasuries, which brought massive buying power to the markets.
  • Foreign flows also poured into Wall Street to chase the raging bull market higher.
  • Lastly, “internet trading” hit the internet, which further opened the doors of the “WallStreet Casino” to the masses.

Yes, for a brief moment, the markets raged as “irrational exuberance” prevailed. Of course, while the rate cuts in 1995 didn’t slow the growth of the “bubble” immediately, it wasn’t long before all the gains were wiped out by the “Dot.com” crash.

Timing, as they say, is everything.

This Isn’t 1995

A quick comparison between 1995, and today, also elicits many other concerns about the markets ability to dramatically extend its current cycle.

From 1991-2000 (10-Years)

  • Personal Incomes averaged 4% and were rising to 5% on an annual rate
  • Employment averaged a 2.5% annual growth rate and was solid heading into 2000.
  • Industrial Production averaged about 5% annual growth and was rising at the end of 1999.
  • Real Consumer Spending averaged a nearly 12% annual growth rate heading into 2000.
  • Real Wages were climbing steadily from 1991 to 1999 and hit a peak of almost 14% in 1999.
  • Real GDP was running at more than 4% annually in December of 1999.

NOTE: There was NO SIGN of RECESSION in late 1999.

Compare the chart above with the one below.

There is a vast difference between the strength of the economy today versus 1999; particularly we are already in a longer economic expansion than we were then.

  • Personal Incomes currently average about 2% versus 4% in 1995
  • Employment is averaging about a 1.5% annualized growth rate versus 2.5% in 1995.
  • Industrial Production has averaged about 2% annual growth vs 5% previously.
  • Real Consumer Spending has averaged about 4% annual growth versus 8-10% in 1995.
  • Real Wages have averaged about a 3.5 annual growth rate versus 8-10% in 1995.
  • Real GDP has averaged about 2% annual growth over the last decade versus 3% previously.

There is also one other significant difference.

In 1995, Consumer Confidence was at about 100 on its way to 140.

Today, it is likely not possible to get more optimistic than consumers are currently.

It’s All Bullish

“We could get more volatility in the coming days, but as we settle into August you’ll see equities start to perk again. My assumption is that we could start to see a buy-the-dip mentality, created by the easy money move and the need to chase returns.”Yousef Abbasi, INTL FCStone

“Low rates will continue to support a higher-than-average valuations for the S&P 500. At the same time that corporations are growing revenue at a healthy clip and appear set to avoid the earnings recession that many investors had been fearing this year.”Brad McMillan, CommonWealth

Not surprisingly, since the Fed’s announcement, the financial media and Wall Street have been pushing the bullish narrative. Just as they did in 1999 and 2007, as there was “no recession in sight,” then either.

The problem is financial media, or Wall Street, is they never tell you when to sell. (They don’t make money when you are in cash.)

Currently, the risk to the market is elevated.

  • Confidence is at highs, not lows.
  • Economic growth is at a cycle peak
  • Earnings growth is beginning to weaken, and corporate profits are on the decline.
  • Valuations are elevated
  • Leverage is at records
  • Stock buyback activity is slowing  (As we noted previously, since 2014, buyback activity has accounted for nearly 100% of net equity purchases in the market and is now slowing).

While it is certainly possible for equities to push higher over the short-term, seemingly to confirm the “bullish calls,” don’t forget your time horizon is substantially longer than 6-12 months. 

No one will ring a bell at the eventual top, the media won’t tell you to “sell,” and the mainstream financial advice will tell you that if your only option is to “buy and hold.” 

If history is any guide, the next mean reverting event will likely wipe out of the bulk of the gains made over the last 5-7 years at a minimum.

If you are close to retirement, it should be clear that risk outweighs the reward currently. 

Not everything the Fed does can be bullish.

The Fed, QE, & Why Rates Are Going To Zero

On Tuesday, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, in his opening remarks at a monetary policy conference in Chicago, raised concerns about the rising trade tensions in the U.S.,

“We do not know how or when these issues will be resolved. As always, we will act as appropriate to sustain the expansion, with a strong labor market and inflation near our symmetric 2 percent objective.”

However, while there was nothing “new” in that comment it was his following statement that sent “shorts” scrambling to cover.

“In short, the proximity of interest rates to the ELB has become the preeminent monetary policy challenge of our time, tainting all manner of issues with ELB risk and imbuing many old challenges with greater significance.  

“Perhaps it is time to retire the term ‘unconventional’ when referring to tools that were used in the crisis. We know that tools like these are likely to be needed in some form in future ELB spells, which we hope will be rare.”

As Zerohedge noted:

“To translate that statement, not only is the Fed ready to cut rates, but it may take ‘unconventional’ tools during the next recession, i.e., NIRP and even more QE.”

This is a very interesting statement considering that these tools, which were indeed unconventional “emergency” measures at the time, have now become standard operating procedure for the Fed.

Yet, these “policy tools” are still untested.

Clearly, QE worked well in lifting asset prices, but not so much for the economy. In other words, QE was ultimately a massive “wealth transfer” from the middle class to the rich which has created one of the greatest wealth gaps in the history of the U.S., not to mention an asset bubble of historic proportions.

However, they have yet to operate within the confines of an economic recession or a mean-reverting event in the financial markets. In simpler terms, no one knows for certain whether the bubbles created by monetary policies are infinitely sustainable? Or, what the consequences will be if they aren’t.

The other concern with restarting monetary policy at this stage of the financial cycle is the backdrop is not conducive for “emergency measures” to be effective. As we wrote in “QE, Then, Now, & Why It May Not Work:”

“If the market fell into a recession tomorrow, the Fed would be starting with roughly a $4 Trillion balance sheet with interest rates 2% lower than they were in 2009. In other words, the ability of the Fed to ‘bail out’ the markets today, is much more limited than it was in 2008.

But there is more to the story than just the Fed’s balance sheet and funds rate. The entire backdrop is completely reversed. The table below compares a variety of financial and economic factors from 2009 to present.

“The critical point here is that QE and rate reductions have the MOST effect when the economy, markets, and investors have been ‘blown out,’ deviations from the ‘norm’ are negatively extended, confidence is hugely negative.

In other words, there is nowhere to go but up.”

The extremely negative environment that existed, particularly in the asset markets, provided a fertile starting point for monetary interventions. Today, as shown in the table above, the economic and fundamental backdrop could not be more diametrically opposed.

This suggests that the Fed’s ability to stem the decline of the next recession, or offset a financial shock to the economy from falling asset prices, may be much more limited than the Fed, and most investors, currently believe.

While Powell is hinting at QE4, it likely will only be employed when rate reductions aren’t enough. Such was noted in 2016 by David Reifschneider, deputy director of the division of research and statistics for the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C., released a staff working paper entitled “Gauging The Ability Of The FOMC To Respond To Future Recessions.” 

The conclusion was simply this:

“Simulations of the FRB/US model of a severe recession suggest that large-scale asset purchases and forward guidance about the future path of the federal funds rate should be able to provide enough additional accommodation to fully compensate for a more limited [ability] to cut short-term interest rates in most, but probably not all, circumstances.”

In effect, Powell has become aware he has become caught in a liquidity trap. Without continued “emergency measures” the markets, and subsequently economic growth, can not be sustained. This is where David compared three policy approaches to offset the next recession:

  1. Fed funds goes into negative territory but there is no breakdown in the structure of economic relationships.
  2. Fed funds returns to zero and keeps it there long enough for unemployment to return to baseline.
  3. Fed funds returns to zero and the FOMC augments it with additional $2-4 Trillion of QE and forward guidance. 

This is exactly the prescription that Jerome Powell laid out on Tuesday suggesting the Fed is already factoring in a scenario in which a shock to the economy leads to additional QE of either $2 trillion, or in a worst case scenario, $4 trillion, effectively doubling the current size of the Fed’s balance sheet.

This is also why 10-year Treasury rates are going to ZERO.

Why Rates Are Going To Zero

I have been discussing over the last couple of years why the death of the bond bull market has been greatly exaggerated. To wit: (Also read: The Bond Bull Market)

“There is an assumption that because interest rates are low, that the bond bull market has come to its inevitable conclusion. The problem with this assumption is three-fold:

  1. All interest rates are relative. With more than $10-Trillion in debt globally sporting negative interest rates, the assumption that rates in the U.S. are about to spike higher is likely wrong. Higher yields in U.S. debt attracts flows of capital from countries with negative yields which push rates lower in the U.S. Given the current push by Central Banks globally to suppress interest rates to keep nascent economic growth going, an eventual zero-yield on U.S. debt is not unrealistic.
  2. The coming budget deficit balloon. Given the lack of fiscal policy controls in Washington, and promises of continued largesse in the future, the budget deficit is set to swell back to $1 Trillion or more in the coming years. This will require more government bond issuance to fund future expenditures which will be magnified during the next recessionary spat as tax revenue falls.
  3. Central Banks will continue to be a buyer of bonds to maintain the current status quo, but will become more aggressive buyers during the next recession. The next QE program by the Fed to offset the next economic recession will likely be $2-4 Trillion which will push the 10-year yield towards zero.”

It’s item #3 that is most important.

In “Debt & Deficits: A Slow Motion Train Wreck” I laid out the data constructs behind the points above.

However, it was in April 2016, when I stated that with more government spending, a budget deficit heading towards $1 Trillion, and real economic growth running well below expectations, the demand for bonds would continue to grow. Even from a purely technical perspective, the trend of interest rates suggested at that time a rate below one-percent was likely during the next economic recession.

Outside of other events such as the S&L Crisis, Asian Contagion, Long-Term Capital Management, etc. which all drove money out of stocks and into bonds pushing rates lower, recessionary environments are especially prone at suppressing rates further. But, given the inflation of multiple asset bubbles, a credit-driven event that impacts the corporate bond market will drive rates to zero.

Furthermore, given rates are already negative in many parts of the world, which will likely be even more negative during a global recessionary environment, zero yields will still remain more attractive to foreign investors. This will be from both a potential capital appreciation perspective (expectations of negative rates in the U.S.) and the perceived safety and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury market. 

Rates are ultimately directly impacted by the strength of economic growth and the demand for credit. While short-term dynamics may move rates, ultimately the fundamentals combined with the demand for safety and liquidity will be the ultimate arbiter.

With the majority of yield curves that we track now inverted, many economic indicators flashing red, and financial markets dependent on “Fed action” rather than strong fundamentals, it is likely the bond market already knows a problem in brewing.

However, while I am fairly certain the “facts” will play out as they have historically, rest assured that if the “facts” do indeed change, I will gladly change my view.

Currently, there is NO evidence that a change of facts has occurred.

Of course, we aren’t the only ones expecting rates to go to zero. As Bloomberg noted:

“Billionaire Stan Druckenmiller said he could see the Fed funds rate going to zero in the next 18 months if the economy softens and that he recently piled into Treasuries as the U.S. trade war with China escalated.

‘When the Trump tweet went out, I went from 93% invested to net flat, and bought a bunch of Treasuries,’ Druckenmiller said Monday evening, referring to the May 5 tweet from President Donald Trump threatening an increase in tariffs on China. ‘Not because I’m trying to make money, I just don’t want to play in this environment.’”

It has taken a massive amount of interventions by Central Banks to keep economies afloat globally over the last decade and there is rising evidence that growth is beginning to decelerate.

While another $2-4 Trillion in QE might indeed be successful in further inflating the third bubble in asset prices since the turn of the century, there is a finite ability to continue to pull forward future consumption to stimulate economic activity. In other words, there are only so many autos, houses, etc., which can be purchased within a given cycle. 

There is evidence the cycle peak has been reached.

If I am correct, and the effectiveness of rate reductions and QE are diminished due to the reasons detailed herein, the subsequent destruction to the “wealth effect” will be far larger than currently imagined. There is a limit to just how many bonds the Federal Reserve can buy and a deep recession will likely find the Fed powerless to offset much of the negative effects. 

If more “QE” works, great.

But as investors, with our retirement savings at risk, what if it doesn’t?Save